



A Journal of Church and Society

Social Progress



Hammar skjöld on International Co-operation

NOVEMBER 1960

Social Progress

Published by the Office of Church and Society of the Board of Christian Education of The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America to provide a forum for the church on subjects of social concern for Christians. It includes program resources, legislative developments, and guides to worship, study, and action for leaders of social action groups in local churches, presbyteries, synods, presbyterial and synodical societies. Articles represent the opinions of the authors.

November 1960

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Artwork in this issue is by Tom Arthur.

Office of Church and Society: Clifford Earle, Margaret E. Kuhn, John H. Marion, Howard C. Maxwell, J. Metz Rollins, Jr., H. B. Sissel; Helen H. Harder (Editorial Assistant), Helen Lineweaver (Director of Washington Office). Address editorial correspondence to Clifford Earle, Secretary and Editor.

Counseling Committee on Church and Society: Malcolm S. Alexander, LeRoy Anderson, Mrs. Werner J. Blanchard, Mrs. Fred. J. Church, Joseph J. Copeland (Chairman), Mrs. Albert L. Elder, David F. Freeman, Robert H. French, Theodore Gill, Edler G. Hawkins, George W. Johns, William Kirkland, Mrs. Horace C. Lukens, Kenneth McGilvray, Mrs. W. J. H. McKnight, Clinton M. Marsh, John O. Mellin, Hans Noll, Miss Mary Jane Patterson, John G. Ramsay, Mrs. Ben Russell, Paul David Sholin, Stephen Stephan, Wolfgang Stolper, Shelton B. Waters.

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BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION



We trust that by the time this article appears in print, the United Nations delegates will have been able to get down to work on the many pressing questions before the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly.

November is too early for a proper review and appraisal of the highly charged opening weeks of the UN meetings in New York. It will take a bit longer for the dust to settle. What is immediately evident is the apprehension of political leaders in all parts of the world about the bad state of Soviet-American relations and the clash of cold war interests in Africa.

Never before in human history have so many great men in public life, heads of governments and foreign ministers, gathered in one place for so long a time. The world had seen nothing like it. Security precautions were given overriding priority both outside and inside the UN buildings on New York's East River. Only those were admitted to the Headquarters who had official reasons for being there and who carried special passes. The public was kept out. But by the miracle of television millions of people in this and other countries were permitted to observe many of the proceedings. It was unbelievable and unforgettable to see the UN General Assembly in session, the delegates in their places, and then to have the camera focus on Nehru, Macmillan, Khrushchev, Herter, Nkrumah, Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, Hussein, Castro, Kadar, Menzies, Hammarskjöld, and others—the men themselves whose names and stations and reputations are so familiar. Here was the setting for encounters and conversations, for exchanges of views and ideas, for negotiations and agreements, that could affect the course of history and decide the fate of our civilization.

With the admission of Cyprus and sixteen new African republics. United Nations membership was enlarged from eighty-two to ninety-nine. All of the new African states, with the exception of Malagasy (Madagascar on our now outdated maps) and Somalia are located in the central or eastern parts of the continent. The brand-new UN member nations are these: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (former Belgian territory), Congo Republic (former French territory), Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mali Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Volta.

Only nine presently independent countries are now outside the United Nations: Switzerland, the People's Republic of China, Outer Mongolia, East Germany, West Germany, North Korea, South Korea, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam.

Ten countries, all in Africa, are preparing for independence, and in some cases the timetable is set: Algeria, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritania, Nyasaland, Rhodesia, Ruanda-Urundi, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, and Uganda. We can expect that in due time these nations too will become members of the United Nations.

There is something new, an unexpected quality, in the nationalism that is sweeping across the newly developing areas of the world. The people of these areas not only want to be free from colonial dependence and control, they want also as free nations to take their places proudly and usefully in the international community and to participate in deliberations and decisions affecting world order and the welfare of people everywhere.

There was a time when certain diplomats of the West feared the day when the doors of the United Nations would be opened wide for the admission of many small, weak, inexperienced countries of Africa and Asia. It has been noted that the new nations seek to send to the UN sessions as their delegates persons of real ability, carefully selected from among the best of their leaders. These delegates are playing roles of increasing importance in the UN and its related bodies. Since the new nations mostly refuse to be aligned with the East or with the West in the cold war competition, their presence in the UN in growing numbers makes it more and more difficult for either side to manipulate the international organization. Indeed, the balance of power is swinging to the neutral bloc. The United Nations with ninety-nine members is not what it used to be with sixty members; it is a better and stronger organization, more capable of serving the goals of peace and freedom.




The Soviet attack upon the person and office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is deplorable, but it may well be regarded as a not too-surprising consequence of the UN's growing effectiveness in dealing with critical and dangerous situations threatening the peace of the world. The occasion of Mr. Khrushchev's broadside, of course, was the signal success of Mr. Hammarskjöld and his colleagues of the UN Secretariat in bringing

ing a measure of peace and order to the torn and tormented Congo, and in neatly offsetting Communist attempts to control the area. The fact is that the Secretary-General acted precisely and impartially in accordance with Security Council resolutions relating to the Congo. He favored neither one side nor the other in the international power play and in the internal struggle for power.

The great strength of Mr. Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General of the United Nations has been his unfailing integrity and impartiality. He can be counted on to interpret and implement UN decisions with utmost fairness and firmness. He has earned the admiration and support of the world's diplomats, some of whom are not a little amazed by the enhanced prestige and influence of both the man and his office, until now when his very success has exposed him to Soviet ire and calumny. It was a great moment when the Secretary-General rejected Mr. Khrushchev's demand that he resign. He intends to stay on the job to the end of his term in 1963, he said, unless the UN decides otherwise, and we can be sure that he will live up to the high expectation he has given the office.

In calling for a radical revamping of the Office of Secretary-General, the Soviet leader revealed how far he would go in devitalizing the United Nations. Mr. Khrushchev quite seriously proposed that the Secretary-General's function be assigned to a three-man team representing the Communist bloc, the Western alliance, and the neutral nations of Africa and Asia, with each of the three having veto power in all decisions affecting the wide range of responsibilities connected with the Secretary-General's Office—and that takes in just about everything the United Nations does. Under this plan the UN would be unable to act decisively or usefully in dealing with any crisis anywhere in which national interests are in conflict. Mr. Khrushchev obviously was not serious when he demanded that his proposal be given immediate approval or else he and his pals would walk out, for the plan was not approved or even considered and the Communist delegations did not withdraw, but we can be sure that we have not heard the last of it.



One thing stands out—we have in the United Nations a better instrument for building and preserving world order than we would have if the San Francisco Conference (in which the UN was created in 1945) were held today. Those who are discouraged by the sad state of international relations and the UN's inability to work miracles, and who therefore plead for a drastic revision of the UN Charter in the direction of world government and power to enforce peace, are living in a world of dream and fantasy. In the present international climate, any vigorous attempt to make the UN stronger, according to our Western ideas of what it ought to be, would very likely destroy it. The Communists already have threatened to abandon the present structure and to form their own organization into which they would seek to draw the neutral nations of Asia and Africa. This threat may be only so

much idle talk, or it may be a lever to force Western concessions in the controversy over Berlin, but it would be foolish for us not to believe that the Soviet bloc is capable of splitting the United Nations and that they may be strongly tempted to do so if there were a really serious effort to change the UN into something even less to Russian liking than the present organization.

If the United Nations is not a perfect instrument, if it is powerless to put an end to the cold war and to control armaments, the trouble is not with it but with the nations holding on to their sovereignties and competing for power and position so that each is a possible threat to the other and each thinks first of its own security. The human race has come a long way in its social evolution, all the way from crudest tribalism to the finest forms of nationhood and international co-operation, but the great breakthrough has not yet come, or come completely, by which true world community is possible.

Featured in this issue of SOCIAL PROGRESS are three articles about the legal standing of the United Nations, the aims of United States foreign policy, and the key international issue of disarmament.

The article by Dag Hammarskjöld on the legal aspects of international co-operation (pages 7-15) is especially timely because of the attacks upon him and his office by Mr. Khrushchev. Here Mr. Hammarskjöld presents his profound conception of the nature and role of the UN in the present stage of human development. He discloses the philosophy that undergirds both his understanding of the office of UN Secretary-General and his wide ranging activities as the world's foremost diplomat.

The study of our country's aims in world affairs (pages 16-30) was made by the Council on Foreign Relations at the request of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. This is a sound discussion of the role of the United States in the United Nations, the great tasks before our nation in a changing world, and the problem of national purpose.

The top priority issue in international relations is disarmament. The presentation on pages 34 to 43 outlines the remarkable story of fifteen years of virtually continuous efforts to resolve deep differences between the East and the West in their views of the kind of peace that is desirable and the effective means of achieving it.

On pages 31 to 33 we list the countries both in and out of the United Nations. The population estimates are the latest and the best we can find. The book section (pages 44-47) describes a dozen important and useful books dealing with international relations.

—The Staff

A Constitutional Framework for International Co-operation

Address by DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the final event of the special convocation and dedicatory celebration marking completion and occupancy of the new law buildings of the University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, May, 1960. Reprinted from *United Nations Review*, June, 1960, United Nations, New York

I WOULD like to share with you some observations regarding a legal problem—I use the word “legal” in its broadest sense—which so far has received but little attention. International law, in spite of the vast literature covering the subject, has on the whole been less favored by serious students than national law. And within the field of international law what might be called international constitutional law and its specific problems has attracted less interest than other parts with their far longer history in the Western world. In fact, international constitutional law is still in an embryonic stage; we are still in the transition between institutional systems of international co-existence and constitutional systems

of international co-operation. It is natural that, at such a stage of transition, theory is still vague, mixed with elements of a political nature and dependent on what basically may be considered sociological theory.

Men organize themselves into families. The families join together in villages or tribes. The tribes and the villages fuse into peoples, and one day, out of the self-consciousness of a people, there develops a feeling of difference and separateness, the positive expression of which is a feeling of nationhood. The nation organizes its life within a set of constitutional rules, evolving in practice or crystallized as law. Under the constitution the people develop national organs with different functions and a divi-

sion of responsibilities representing a balance of power. Through those organs laws are given, setting the pattern for the lives and activities of the individuals and the groups that constitute the nation.

Between Nations

Is that the end of the road of the development of human society? Of course not. Nation borders on nation, peoples get in touch with one another, and whatever differences there may exist and whatever conflicts of interest the people may see, they are forced to live together, fighting or in peace, as neighbors with limits put by nature of their possible self-sufficiency and for that reason with a need to develop forms for international intercourse, permitting more or less highly developed degrees of co-operation. So an institutional system of coexistence is developed with its rules and practices. Still there is no international society. Still the nation remains the highest fully organized form for the life of peoples.

However primitive a basic institu-

tional pattern may be, it carries within it seeds for the growth of higher social organisms, covering wider areas and groups of peoples. To use my terminology of a moment ago, such an institutional system for coexistence, stage by stage, may be developed and enriched until, on single points or on a broad front, it passes over into a constitutional system of co-operation. When that happens, we get in a first, necessarily rudimentary form, a form of society which, while preserving and protecting the lives of the nations, points toward an international constitutional system surmounting the nations, utilizing them to the extent that smaller units are more efficient instruments for evolution, but creating rules that limit the influence of the nations in fields where bigger units present greater possibilities for development and survival.

I believe it is useful, in the discussion of the development of human society, be it national or international, to keep in mind this sociological perspective taken over from theories of biological evolution. It is a perspective that helps us to a more realistic appraisal of what it is we have achieved and what it is we are trying to do, as well as of the scope and significance of our failures and our successes. It also gives us a broader and more organic sense of the role of law—again I use the word in its broadest sense, including not only written law but the whole social pattern of established rules of action and behavior—making us see the differences as well as the similarities between the national and international field, and warning us against false analogies.



TCA

Coexistence and Co-operation

In the light of this approach, the value of speculation about what should be the ultimate constitutional form for international co-operation is obviously limited. Those who advocate world government, and this or that special form of world federalism, often present challenging theories and ideas, but we, like our ancestors, can only press against the preceding wall that hides the future. It is by such efforts, pursued to the best of our ability, more than by the construction of ideal patterns to be imposed upon society, that we lay the basis and pave the way for the society of the future.

Our century has established a rich pattern of approaches to the development of an institutional framework for coexistence, as well as for a constitutional framework for international co-operation. In this respect our time is as much in the front of evolution as it is in the field of natural sciences. It would take me much too far if, on this occasion, I were to try to make an analysis of these various efforts. I must limit my brief comments to developments around which interest and activities have recently tended to center, such as the European efforts to tie the countries of the Continent together in new patterns, providing for intensified co-operation, and, especially, the United Nations family of international organizations.

In a galaxy of nations like the European one, there are, of course, strongly ingrained patterns and inherited sets of rules which integrate the area. The life of those nations develops within a system explained by

a number of shared interests and basic concepts, which set a framework for trade, for travel and exchange of people, for movement of capital, and for exchange of ideas. Within the system created by those rules we have, in a sense, a kind of "common market," which, however, does not infringe on the sovereignty of any of the nations forming part of the market and which, therefore, still lacks completely what might be called a constitutional element. It thus remains a purely institutional pattern. With the recent creation of the European Common Market of six nations, the Coal and Steel Community, and similar bodies, a decisive step has been taken in the further development of this institutional framework. In fact, by these actions the system has been pushed beyond the border of institutional arrangements and has come to include some initial constitutional elements.

Regional Organizations

The institutional evolution in Europe has brought us a step in the direction of a true constitutional framework for co-operation which, through experimental stages of a confederal nature, may finally lead to some kind of federal system or even stronger forms of association. However, just as in the case of world federalism, I think it is wise to avoid talking of this or that kind of ultimate political target and to realize that the development is still in an early stage of institutional evolution, although a few vanguard penetrations into the constitutional area have taken place. What seems imperative is to push forward institutionally and, eventually, constitu-

tionally all along the line, guided by current needs and experiences, without preconceived ideas of the ultimate form.

It may be worth mentioning that, according to statements made by the President of France, the present approach to the idea of a French-African community has essential elements in common with the attitude just described. If I understand the policy correctly, it works in the direction of a far-reaching development of institutional patterns without any definite stand now being taken on the constitutional element, which thus is permitted to grow out of the evolving institutional pattern, whatever the direction which the interplay of forces may later establish. When, for example, in the case of the Malagasy Republic, it is said that the new republic will have full independence while, on the other hand, it will be in a close co-operation with France, provided for by a set of agreements, this seems to reflect a state of affairs characterized by a highly elaborate institutional framework which, however, does not reach into the sphere of constitutional arrangements.

It is known that Sir Winston Churchill, in his time, advocated an approach to the building of a world community through the creation of regional organizations as stepping-stones to more highly developed forms of international coexistence or co-operation. We see instead the advance being made in part only through regional arrangements, but in part—and mainly—independently of such arrangements and directly on the basis of universality. If Sir Winston's line had been fol-

lowed, it would, with my terminology, have meant that regional organizations step by step would have developed a basic institutional pattern for universal coexistence by which, later on, a push forward, on the universal level, could have been tried in the direction of a constitutional pattern.

The United Nations

If we accept the interpretation given here to the European community, the United Nations could, in similar sense, be called a "community," although of a universal character. It represents in itself, with the methods of operation and the rules established, an elaboration of an institutional pattern of coexistence. I even has, in theory, points where it reaches into the constitutional sphere; I have, of course, in mind especially the authority given to the Security Council to act with mandatory power, provided the action is supported unanimously by the permanent members. However, as is natural with a more complex system built up of a greater number of components, among which—to use the language of natural science—many fields forces of repulsion tend to balance or outbalance forces of attraction, the cohesion is more unstable and the field covered by the institutional pattern less extended or more marginal than in the case of regional groupings.

Viewed in this light, the United Nations is an experimental operation on one of the lines along which men at present push forward in the direction of higher forms of an international society. It is obvious that we cannot regard the line of approach

represented by the United Nations as intrinsically more valuable or more promising than other lines, in spite of the fact that, through its universality, it lies closer to or points more directly toward the ideal of a true constitutional framework for worldwide international co-operation, and notwithstanding the obvious weaknesses of regional approaches to such co-operation. However, if one cannot a priori give it a higher value, it is, on the other hand, equally impermissible to regard it as less promising than experiments at present pursued on other lines. The effort carried on within and through the United Nations is an effort just as necessary as other experiments, and nothing short of the pursuit of this specific experiment with all our ability, all our



energy, and all our dedication can be defended. In fact, the effort seems already to have been carried so far that we have conquered essential new ground for our work for the future. This would remain true in all circumstances and even if political com-

plications were one day to force us to a wholly new start.

UN Structure

When the United Nations was created, the founders had the experience of the League of Nations and also the experience of such a highly evolved constitutional pattern as that established on the American continent. A strong influence from both these experiences can be seen in the Charter of the United Nations.

We have an Assembly of state representatives with an equal voice in the deliberations and decisions, irrespective of the size of the nation for whom they speak. But the "legislative" powers of the Assembly have been limited to recommendations which, legally, at present are likely to be the maximum attainable. We have one collective "executive" organ, formed on the pattern of the Council of the League of Nations, but with voting rules adjusted to the political realities of the world and, therefore, recognizing that mandatory authority cannot be vested in such an organ unless supported by the main powers in the world arena. We have, on the other hand, also what may be called a one-man "executive," with explicit authority in the administrative field, supplementary to, but not overlapping, the authority of either the Council or the Assembly.

Further, we have two organs with elements of both "legislative" and "executive" power, of which one carries the special responsibilities of a political nature which belong to the United Nations under the Trusteeship System, and the other one has broad authority in the field of co-ordination of action toward the tar-

gets established under the Charter.

Finally, we have the International Court of Justice as a counterpart to a national judiciary. It would have possibilities to develop into a more important element in the settlement of international conflicts than it now is, were the unfortunate and self-defeating reservations against its jurisdiction made by some member countries to be withdrawn. It should be stressed that all these organs function within the framework of the Charter, a document that by its very nature and by the way in which it establishes solemn commitments to certain joint principles and purposes has a clear constitutional aspect, in the sense in which I am using this term here.

The system we find in the United Nations has its strength and its weakness. In the light of the experiences of fifteen years, undoubtedly some changes of the pattern would be made if the Charter were to be revised. These changes, however, would probably not refer to the various organs as such, but rather to their relative authority—that is to say, to the division of responsibilities—and to their responsibilities—and to their methods of operation.

Flexibility

The experiment carried on through and within the United Nations has found in the Charter a framework of sufficient flexibility to permit growth beyond what seems to have been anticipated in San Francisco. Even without formal revisions, the institutional system embodied in the organization has undergone innovations explained by organic adaptation to needs and experiences.

On this point a word of warning may be in order. The fact that important sections of the Charter—I think especially of Chapter VII, which lays down the rules for interventions of the United Nations with military force—so far have not been implemented and still seem far from application, does not mean that on these points we are facing a dead letter, and that to the same extent the power of the Security Council, as the executive organ entrusted with authority under Chapter VII, has withered away. It is not so because, with some changes in the world situation, the clauses of the Charter to which I have referred may come to be seen as providing the basis for an adequate response to the anticipated needs. If and when it should so happen, the activities of the Security Council would automatically show a corresponding expansion.

What I have said is not hypothetical, as may be seen from the current discussion on disarmament. Were developments now to lead the main powers to an agreement on even limited disarmament, the need for an institutional evolution in the direction foreseen in Chapter VII would at once present itself with considerable strength.

Specialized Agencies

So far I have referred only to the United Nations itself. At its side stand the specialized agencies with somewhat similar organization systems. They are autonomous, though co-ordinated with the United Nations within the terms of the Charter. There are provisions for co-operation among the various organizations within the United Nations family.

SOCIAL PROGRESS

However, this co-operation is established mainly on the Secretariat level, and the group of organizations as a whole has no organ which, through a majority decision, can lay down a common line of action. A committee of the administrative heads of the various organizations, established for co-operation, functions on a basis of unanimity which is made necessary by the autonomy of the organizations.

Experience shows that neither the central role of the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the fact that, generally speaking, the same nations are members of all the organizations, provides for an effective integration among them. Thus we see at the present stage the paradox that the organizations created for the development of an institutional framework for international coexistence are themselves bound together within such a pattern only in a very loose form, which is not reinforced to any considerable extent by an integration of policies within various member countries.

This fact, which is strongly indicative of the experimental and, one might even say, embryonic character of the present efforts, is of special significance when we face a need to expand the field to be covered by international co-operation. Historically we have to register a tendency to create new organs for each new major field of activity. Thus international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which for all practical purposes functions as a specialized agency. Similarly, in the case of control of the implemen-

tation of an agreement on nuclear tests, the creation of a new autonomous organ is anticipated. Finally, even in the field of disarmament, which under the Charter is a central task of the United Nations, suggestions have been made to the effect that activities of decisive significance should be entrusted to a new organ that might be not only administratively but also politically independent of the United Nations.

Co-ordination Problem

In view of the tentative stage so far reached as regards co-ordination of activities among the various organizations working on the basis of universality, it may be questioned whether the tendency to which I have just referred will not prove to be a deviation leading us away from the most fruitful direction for an evolution of a framework for international co-operation. At least it seems to me that, if this tendency is accepted and continued, it should be counterbalanced by an effort to evolve new forms for integration of the work of the various international agencies. I am not in a position to say in what direction such forms may be found, but unless they are developed we may come to face a situation where the very growth of the framework for international co-operation tends to lead to an ultimate weakening. If I am permitted to fall back again on a parallel with biological developments, it is as if we were to permit the growth of a tree to be weakened by the developments of too many branches, finally sapping its strength, so that it breaks down under its own weight.

Having spoken about the risk of

disintegration of the international framework through a proliferation of organs, I should mention also the opposite risk, that by combining too many tasks too closely within one and the same organ, you break it up, as of course no organization can carry an unlimited burden because of the simple fact that no leaders of such an organization can have the capacity to give satisfactory leadership over ever-expanding areas.

The two risks indicated call for careful thought before we push much farther forward. We must seek the optimum balance between a system with a large number of autonomous bodies and a system with strong concentration of tasks within a lesser number of organizations. The way will have to be found by trial and error, but planning is necessary because of the difficulty to take a step backward or to change fundamentally what once has been established. Probably, new forms will have to be devised, not only, as already indicated, for an integration of activities

among autonomous organizations but also for the delegation of powers within this or that organization without a breaking up of its inner unity.

What is true of the United Nations family of organizations as a whole is true also of the United Nations. The developing activities over ever-wider fields, in response to the needs which we face, may serve to alert us to possible risks of a lack of integration even within the organization itself. The correctives exist. There is the unifying influence of the General Assembly itself and of other main organs. There are the co-ordinating activities within and through the Secretariat. But, again, the human factor comes into play, and I would in this context, in concluding, like to quote one example of interest as a comparison of constitutional problems facing an international organization with those we know from national administrations. You will excuse me if I refer to my own office.

Office of Secretary-General

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the chief administrative officer of the organization and, as such, the only elected member of the Secretariat. The founders of the United Nations may in this context have looked to the American Constitution. The chief of any government, or the Chief Executive in the United States, has the assistance of a group of close collaborators who represent the same basic approach, and to whom he therefore can delegate a considerable part of his responsibilities. On the basis of universality, especially in a divided world but generally speaking as long as nations have opposing interests,



no similar arrangement is possible within the United Nations. This may have been understood in San Francisco, but I guess that it was felt that it did not matter too much as the Secretary-General had mainly administrative responsibilities. However, the position of the Office of the Secretary-General within the United Nations, explained in part by the fact that he is the only elected officer in principle representing all members, has led to increasingly widespread diplomatic and political activities. This is in response to developing needs. If negotiations are necessary, or if arrangements with a certain intended political impact are to be made, but member nations are not in a position to lay down exact terms of reference, a natural response of the organization is to use the services of the Secretary-General for what they may be worth.

The tasks thus entrusted to the Secretary-General are mostly of such a character that, with the composition of an international Secretariat and of the group of his closest collaborators, with its naturally wide geographical distribution, he must carry out the work on a fairly personal basis. Obviously, there is no parallel to this in the field of national politics or diplomacy, and the case I have described, therefore, highlights one of those essential complications which characterize in the

constitutional field the effort to work in the direction of organized international co-operation. At an experimental stage, such difficulties may be faced on a day-to-day basis, but in the long run they are likely to require imaginative and constructive constitutional innovations.

Perhaps a future generation, which knows the outcome of our present efforts, will look at them with some irony. They will see where we fumbled, and they will find it difficult to understand why we did not see the direction more clearly and work more consistently toward the target it indicates. So it will always be, but let us hope that they will not find any reason to criticize us because of a lack of that combination of steadfastness of purpose and flexibility of approach which alone can guarantee that the possibilities which we are exploring will have been tested to the full. Working at the edge of the development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to have been of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with our best understanding, in recognition of its limits but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to co-operate.

The Role of the United States in World Affairs

From a Study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the United States Senate by the Council on Foreign Relations

HISTORIC AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THE United States, new to the exercise of vast international responsibilities, has not found it easy to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. Nevertheless, the record of the past fifteen years has been a creditable one. At critical points the Government took and carried through, with the support of the people, major decisions which were bold in conception and salutary in their effect. Such were the original decisions of 1943 to 1945 to take a leading part in setting up the United Nations, the decisions for aid to Greece and Turkey and for the Marshall Plan in 1947 to 1948, the resistance to Communist aggression in Korea in 1950, and the stand taken in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Many other ground-breaking steps were taken, providing the outlines of a national strategy. At the core of American policy has been the creation of a common front with like-minded nations of the Atlantic world, marked by the establishment and


growth of NATO and by the reorganization and strengthening of the inter-American system. The peace treaty and security arrangements with Japan provided an anchor of free world security in the Far East. The chain of alliances, regional security organizations, and arrangements for bases—not all of them of equal importance from the standpoint of military security and some carrying political liabilities as well as benefits—was gradually extended to include other countries threatened by Communist imperialism. In addition to the alliance system, the United States has taken the lead in building a wider network of arrangements for economic and technical assistance to numerous countries of the free world (both allies and neutrals), based on mutual recognition of a common interest in strengthening their independence against outside pressures and in fostering their economic progress.

Concentration on resisting the Communist threat, especially the military threat, has had its successes. But the demands of the cold war, the need for meeting successive challenges at this or that point on the periphery of the Communist empire, have obscured many other demands which are bound to affect America's interests and role in the world of the future. They have also tended to divert attention from the formulation and pursuit of long-term policies without which we can see no clear outline of our future relations with other nations, and indeed no successful outcome of the cold war itself.

The record of the postwar period shows abundantly the difficulties and dilemmas that a democracy faces in playing a role of leadership in the contemporary world. For the most part, the complex forces and situations with which the United States has had to deal require an understanding on the part of government and people and an efficiency in the process of policy making which we are only beginning to develop. Concern for the opinion of other free nations and the real risks of war serve to limit the dynamic nature of the policies the United States can adopt in directly challenging the Communist bloc within the territories it now holds. In that sense American policies have had a defensive character. But clearly the United States could have more dynamic and positive policies in the free world itself, where it does have more freedom of action and opportunity for leadership.

Here, too, there are real limitations, although they provide no excuse for passivity. World affairs are unpredictable, charged with dilem-

mas that appear to be, and may in fact be, insoluble in this generation. The United States cannot define for itself a single foreign policy that covers all countries and all contin-



gencies. The choices cannot always be clear and consistent. Policy has to deal with the world as it is and as it evolves. It cannot rest solely on an idea of the world as we would like it to be.

Basically the United States relies on persuasion and consent in order to obtain the co-operation and support of others, and the fact is that nations of the free world often see the issues in a quite different light from the United States: they have their own interests, their own ideas on such matters as the relative importance of the Communist threat and the merits of participation in military alliances. Some of the conflicts within the free world go deep, and the United States has frequently found that it cannot act decisively in regard to them, especially when it is trying to retain or to win the co-

operation and good will of all the contending parties.

Yet the instruments available for the exercise of leadership are considerable. The fact that those nations which seek a balance to Soviet power and security against aggression look to the United States as the nucleus of free world strength gives this country great influence. Its material wealth and productivity provide economic resources that weigh heavily in relations with other nations. And international leadership based on

cast its policies adequately for the long term. Part of the explanation may lie in defects in the machinery of policy making. Part may lie in the fact of the constitutional division of responsibility for foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches of the government, which, besides requiring a special diplomacy of its own, tends to tie important policies and programs to the Procrustean inflexibility of the fiscal year.

Yet fundamentally it is a question of attitudes, foresight, and leadership within the American body politic. The traditional division of powers does not preclude co-operation or prevent either branch from taking the initiative in developing such co-operation along new lines of foreign policy. The Senate, in particular, has shown itself on occasions in the past a source of fruitful ideas and approaches. While it should not take on itself the detailed planning and policy functions that lie within the province of the executive, it can and should play a great part in leadership, especially in the guidance of public opinion, as it has at times of crucial decision; for example, in the Vandenberg resolution of 1948.

Whatever the reasons, the tendency of the United States up to now has been to treat foreign relations as a series of crises, of moves and countermoves in the cold war, in which the United States has attempted to combine firmness in holding the line against Communist expansion with measures to build up defensive strength in the free world and with a willingness to negotiate on outstanding issues. This will not be sufficient for the future.



consent need not mean compromising our fundamental principles and policies. Such leadership makes heavy demands on the leader, but it promises solid and lasting results. It is a matter of finding common ground, *for which America's own conduct, both international and domestic, is as important as the persuasiveness of its diplomacy.*

When all the factors more or less inherent in the world situation are given their due, it still must be said that the United States has failed to

The great question is whether the United States can, concurrently, act decisively to meet the succession of threats and challenges from the Communist bloc as they arise and also add new dimensions to its foreign policy by taking measures aimed at the world's other problems and at the longer-term future. Present conditions are as favorable to initiatives on the part of free nations as they are to those of the Soviet Union or Communist China. Opportunities to create conditions conducive to the growth of freedom in the world and to the establishment of a durable peace are there. The question is whether the United States will have the will and ability to seize them.

Long-term estimates and planning cannot safely ignore such subjects as the course of developments within the Communist empire over the next ten years, the effects of China's growing power, the kind of relations the United States should aim to achieve with the Soviet Union over the long run, the growth of new international institutions, the future importance of nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and all the forces near or under the surface today which are likely to change the shape of the world's major problems over the next ten years or so. Constructive planning should guide us in meeting the crises of the future and in shaping now what we can to shape that future.

THE TASKS BEFORE US: BASIC AIMS AND POLICIES

Our purpose here is to show the nature and diversity of the problems and opportunities ahead and the magnitude of the efforts required to meet them in facing the future with hope and confidence.

Building an International Order

First and foremost, the United States must have a broad, basic aim which responds to the deep aspirations of the world's peoples as well as meets the challenge from the Communist bloc. Such an aim is the building, jointly with other free nations, of a new international order.

A new world is in the making. We know that the Communist powers will do everything they can to shape it to their will. Whether they can be prevented from doing so depends in large part upon the United States. We know also that the United States

will have opportunities to exert a more positive influence. For most peoples of the world this is an age of change, of liberation, of promise, and of hope. Only creative policies, acts that catch the imagination of people everywhere, will lead to a world in which nations can live free of alien domination and in which the security and growth of our own society and that of others can be assured.

It is obvious that the policies to support such aims cannot be conceived and carried out purely as national policies of the United States or as a crusade for the American way of life. The search for national fulfillment in freedom and its continuing enrichment becomes a search for an international order in which the freedom of nations is recognized as interdependent, and for which

policies must be jointly undertaken to make of the free world a going concern in the success of which all peoples have a stake.

The free world, of course, is made up of many different nations with wide variations in their institutions, their aims, and their attitudes. But broad common interests, most of which are stated in the United Nations Charter, do exist and can be built upon, without requiring a rigid, uniform approach to all. There is room in such a co-operative international community for states with differing political, economic, and social systems, including states which profess or wish to be Socialist. Indeed, the close co-operation of states whose economic systems bear different labels can help to discredit the false thesis that the cold war is a struggle between socialism and capitalism instead of between Communist imperialism and the right to freedom. Success in such common endeavors may also be the most promising means by which the free world can increase pressures within the Communist bloc for more accommodating policies on the part of the Communist regimes.

Central to any consideration of the future is the question of security and the preservation of peace. By force of circumstances the United States and other nations associated with it have not been able to rely solely or principally on the United Nations. They have had to safeguard their security through bilateral agreements and regional arrangements, with their own military power serving as the deterrent to aggression against them. The potentialities of the United Nations, however, are also of the greatest importance.

Although the United Nations has not been the cornerstone of American foreign policy as was first hoped, it does embody the ideal of collective security which the American people have so strongly held since its founding in 1945. It surely must be our purpose to maintain it, to strengthen it, and to help it gradually to acquire more authority. There may be many matters on which the United Nations will provide the obvious or only seat of authority to oversee or to enforce agreements that may be reached. Agreed limitation and control of armaments, for example, will have to be policed by a body acting under international agreement. Where the United States can get Soviet co-operation to use and strengthen the UN machinery for this and other purposes, so much the better. Where it cannot, it should still use all opportunities to work with free world countries to this end.

More effective use of the judicial organ of the United Nations—the International Court of Justice—is an obvious and necessary means of building a better international order. The ideal of a world under law, a goal that reflects America's own experience and its long-standing convictions, can best be approached through strengthening the prestige and the authority of the one judicial body of world-wide membership. Clearly the first step, for those nations, including the United States, which originally accepted the jurisdiction of the court only with reservations concerning matters they deem to be domestic, is to withdraw those limitations on their participation in the processes of judicial settlement.

The United Nations has performed, and should continue to perform, many useful functions: as a forum to sound or rally world opinion, as a channel for negotiations with friends or adversaries, and as an instrument for resolving the disputes of nations willing to respect the Charter. As the countries of the free world seek closer ties among themselves, they should find that the United Nations, time and again, affords means to settle differences, to co-ordinate policies, and to undertake joint schemes of mutual aid, co-operation, and development. Because the specialized agencies of the United Nations may be especially suited to such efforts, the United States should seek every opportunity to use them and to support their activities, while working to make them more effective channels of international action.

The Atlantic Community

A theme that runs through the American outlook on the world since far back in our history has been the common heritage of Western civilization. Two World Wars and especially our experience since the second have left no doubt that the future of America is tied to that of the Atlantic community, which includes Western Europe and the entire Western Hemisphere. However we view the future, it is hard to imagine America's place in the world other than in close association with its partners in Europe, in Canada, and in Latin America.

At present the principal organs, of prime importance for security, are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States. There is every reason to

strengthen them in every possible way. But it is essential to retain a flexibility of approach. For purposes other than security, such as the growth of economic co-operation, other organizations may prove more effective. The boldness of some of the steps taken thus far should not inhibit even bolder thinking on such questions as how fast and how far Western Europe should move toward integration, in what ways the United States should be associated with that process, and what closer ties should link Europe, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Latin America.

The solidarity of the Atlantic nations, however, is not exclusive. It should not represent, or appear to represent, a common front against non-Western nations of the free world. It is rather a means by which nations that value freedom can serve the general cause of freedom.

The Less Developed Areas

Vital decisions lie ahead also in the relationships between the industrialized countries of the free world (principally North America, Western Europe, and Japan) and those countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which are less developed. For a long time to come the latter will experience revolutionary conditions, problems of an economic growth that lags behind popular expectations, and in some cases an ominous population explosion.

The economic and technical assistance programs carried on by the United States over the past decade represent a recognition of those problems and a start on attacking them. For the most part, however,

they have been a mixture of emergency measures, palliatives, and efforts to strengthen allies for primarily military reasons. Most of those measures have been necessary and useful. But the need for a more ambitious, longer term, and more pointedly direct approach, on a basis that is broader than U.S. programs alone, can clearly be seen.

There must be movement of capital goods from the industrial to the less developed countries going well beyond the present volume; a massive effort to build up technical and administrative competence; action to correct or minimize the effects of drastic swings in the prices of certain basic commodities, a matter of special importance to Latin America; and urgent planning on how to tackle the population problem in the areas of rapid growth before it reaches the proportions of disaster. It is in the interest of the entire free world to have some of the less developed countries, soon, reach the point of break-through to self-sustained development. Western Europe and Japan can and should share in these efforts to a much greater extent than hitherto. But their contribution is not a substitute but a supplement to our own, which must also be greater than in the past.

The necessary decisions for large-scale assistance to the less developed countries should not be made contingent on an agreement to reduce armaments that would free funds for that purpose. If the assistance is necessary and desirable—and it is—the advanced countries should provide it without regard to the progress achieved in limiting armaments by international agreement.

The political problems will be as formidable as the economic. Many of the new and less developed countries have no early prospect of stability either internally or among themselves. Their leadership often resorts to the emotional appeals of nationalism as a substitute for statesmanship. Serious barriers still stand in the way of co-operation with the West, some of them the result of policies in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia which Western nations considered necessary for security but which unfortunately injected them into local political conflicts and alienated those who sought a neutral position in relation to the cold war. Such policies deserve searching reappraisal.

Where the colonial issue still remains, as in some parts of Africa, and even in areas where relations of dependence have been liquidated, it presents special difficulties for the United States because of our ties with the colonial powers in Europe and the risks of a lasting alienation from the new nations. Because the peoples of Africa are determined to achieve self-government, it is dangerous for the United States to be associated in their minds with policies that seem to have the effect of denying it to them.

The advance of human welfare and standards of living on a broad front throughout the free world, commensurate with the advances in science and technology, can hardly proceed without new forms of co-operation. As in the case of the requirements for security, many problems will be too big to be dealt with on the old basis of negotiation among a great number of sovereign

national states. Others will be less and less suited to the type of bilateral arrangement on which U.S. aid programs have been based. Long-range development is a broad world problem. Handling public aid primarily as a national proposition on the part of both donor and recipient tends on both sides to inject national policies and sentiments into the picture and thus to increase the political difficulties and jeopardize the hoped-for economic results. We know from experience that the granting or lending country becomes the natural target of criticism, no matter how large the programs may be.

Now that the other Western countries are in a position to join in the providing of aid, a multinational structure including both lending and borrowing states to carry out the necessary programs offers a means of increasing the total effort while avoiding the difficulties inherent in the bilateral method. It could be most helpful also in blunting the damaging political effects of the bilateral programs of the Communist powers. It makes it easier to tackle the economic problems on their merits without raising fears or wounding sensibilities on such issues as political strings, national sovereignty, and nonintervention. What advantages the United States might lose in giving up direct control of the expenditure of funds it should more than regain in sounder political relationships.

The multinational approach need not deprive the major providers of a voice, a very influential voice, such as they have in the International Bank and presumably will have in the International Development As-

sociation. Bilateral programs will continue to be useful in certain instances. But the emphasis in the future should be on the multilateral approach.

Meeting the Communist Challenge

Seen in the longer perspective, meeting the present and continuing challenge of the Communist regimes is only a part of the complex task ahead. But it is obviously a vital part. It is a means of buying time to achieve a higher level of sanity and order in world affairs. It lays on us certain minimum requirements of policy and action which must be met if this nation is to survive and grow in freedom.

Some of those requirements are military. The magnitude of the military effort should be determined by military needs, determined as objectively as possible, and taking into account the needs and contributions of other nations associated with us.

Military measures, however, will not provide security in any absolute sense, nor will they guarantee the attainment of national objectives or some kind of victory in the cold war. They are no substitute for foreign policy. Indeed, undue emphasis on the military aspects can be an obstacle to co-operation with nations important to us, and to the success of our military strategy. But a basic military posture must be maintained. It is the underpinning without which the other instruments of policy cannot be effective.

Limitation and Control of Armaments

Progress toward disarmament through the limitation and control of

armaments is made urgent by the growing destructiveness of modern weapons, the projection of military power into outer space, and the prospective spread of nuclear weapons among an increasing number of states. The nature of nuclear warfare has made the arms race, with its dangers of total catastrophe, a matter of commanding concern to the man in the street as to the expert and the statesman. The whole process of working steadily toward a better world order has a certain unreality in men's minds when they live under the threat of seeing all civilization engulfed by a nuclear war.

These considerations make it imperative for the United States to conduct serious negotiations for international agreement on limitation, reduction, and control of armaments. Despite the negative results of fifteen years of negotiation and the unhopeful prospect ahead, a negative or perfunctory approach to the subject on the part of the United States cannot be permitted. It would compromise American influence abroad, jeopardize the aims of our foreign policy, and produce repercussions that might well impair the confidence of the American people in themselves and in their leadership.

Even though it may be illusory and put forward for propaganda purposes, the Soviet proposal for complete disarmament has to be taken seriously and fully explored. The United States should give further and deeper study to concrete ways of attacking the problem; such aspects as the means of control, the successive stages of disarmament, and especially the possibilities of agreements involving mutual but not

necessarily uniform or similar concessions on weapons, troop strengths, bases and positions; for it is in such practical trading, taking account of the dissimilarities in Soviet and Western strengths and positions, that the best chances for progress may lie.

These points will probably have to be dealt with in direct and secret negotiations with the Soviet Government, without neglecting adequate consultation with our major allies; but simultaneous discussions should be carried on with broader participation in the UN framework in recognition of the interest of all nations in this matter.

There are really no sound alternatives to negotiation. We cannot be content with indefinite continuance of the present situation. We cannot look forward with equanimity to an all-out arms race extending even into the unlimited realms of space. The American people have rejected, as they must, any solution through a so-called preventive attack. Likewise, they must not fall into the trap of accepting Soviet proposals lacking the indispensable provisions for inspection and control. The United States should, therefore, take the initiative and put forward new proposals of its own, seeking continuously and in every possible way to get agreement on limited aspects of the issue and on the stages of a general plan.

We wish to emphasize three general points that place the question in the context of the basic aims of American policy and should guide planning and negotiation on this subject: (1) The question of limitation and control of armaments is directly

related to the new international order that the United States and other free nations must seek to build; such an order cannot be one dominated by an uncontrolled arms race and the threat of unlimited destruction. (2) Significant progress in the control of arms demands a sincere commitment to the concept of collective security and to the development, gradual as it may be, of a stronger international political structure, which is indispensable to any durable arrangement for inspection and control. (3) The inevitable risks involved in any proposals for the limitation and control of armaments should be weighed against the risks of failure to make any progress at all. The present state of affairs provides no such absolute security that the United States can afford to take refuge in an excess of caution in judging proposals, whatever their source, that offer a real possibility of progress.

Let us recognize, however, that the chances for agreement and tangible progress depend on the attitudes and policies of the Communist powers. The Soviet leadership may have reasons of its own for wanting agreement on some aspects of the problem, and this possibility we should not neglect. But the ideology and past conduct of the Soviet regime give little reason to hope for an enforceable general agreement. The United States cannot risk its own and the free world's security on unsecured paper promises or inadequate provisions of control to prevent violations.


Reduction of armaments should not be regarded as the only or the principal avenue to peace. Arma-

ments tend to reflect political conflicts. Settlement or attenuation of the conflicts should automatically reduce the dangers and burdens of the arms race; failure to settle them makes agreement on armaments terribly difficult if not impossible. Yet this country must not take the position that nothing can or should be done about this latter question until the political conflicts are resolved. It should proceed simultaneously on both fronts.

The Longer Range

Even should agreement on limitation of armaments prove possible, even if what Mr. Khrushchev says about disarmament, relaxing tension, and ending the cold war is taken at face value, this leaves no room for relaxation of effort on the part of the United States and other free nations. There is no present or prospective change in basic Soviet aims. The Soviet leaders believe history to be on their side. We cannot risk our future on the easy assumption that they are wrong. The peaceful com-

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petition that is offered demands all possible effort and sacrifice to meet it on the levels of diplomacy, economic policy, and political action. Whatever surcease the Soviets might gain from the arms race will mean increased challenges in these other fields. The rapid growth of the Soviet economy enables them to use trade and aid much more effectively than in the past as instruments to extend Soviet influence in parts of the free world.

Momentary relaxation of tensions holds out no promise of an end to the cold war. The Soviet leaders have shown that they can turn tensions on and off as it suits their own strategy. Their proposal to end the cold war is to end it on their terms, to consolidate their past gains, which the United States cannot formally recognize without betrayal of basic principles and serious loss of prestige and position, and to make the free world vulnerable to new thrusts in the future.

Acceptance of the challenge of the cold war as a long-term proposition compels the United States and the nations associated with it to maintain and to strengthen those policies which are best suited to the competition, and to seek new policies that can gain maximum support in the free world to this end. It is not possible at present to see the end of the struggle or to fashion a national strategy that will guarantee victory in the sense of the end of communism. What the United States can rationally seek is an eventual modification of the nature of the competition, a gradual change in Soviet policies so that they no longer suppress or threaten the liberty of other na-

tions. Such an outcome—now merely a hope—will depend primarily on developments within the Communist bloc itself, but the process will be influenced, perhaps, considerably, by what happens outside, and especially by what America does or does not do.

Negotiation, too, must play its part in the American response to the Communist challenge, both as an arm of strategy and as a means of seeking mutually acceptable arrangements, if only limited and partial ones. The importance of acceptable agreements on such questions as disarmament and Germany is such that a continuing reappraisal of the possibilities is necessary. On certain issues the United States has no choice but to stand firm. But there is no *status quo* which it cannot expect to see, and should not wish to see, changed. The question is how it will be changed. The play of political and other forces keeps the world in a state of flux, especially in those areas where no stable settlements were reached after the Second World War; our problem is not to be left with untenable positions and bankrupt policies when the situation changes.

All opportunities for settlement should be exploited, without sacrificing vital interests or concluding agreements in which those interests become dependent solely on the Communists' good faith. Most of these efforts will be fruitless. We do not, however, know how the Soviet and Chinese societies will eventually evolve. The evidence available now does not justify a prediction of basic change, but it is at least possible that time will bring to the fore new

elements less dedicated to expansion and more willing to settle outstanding issues with the West; the continuing process of negotiation may even encourage such trends. We should be aware that international alignments are not timeless and unchanging; China's role in another generation, for example, should occupy our attention now as it must also occupy the attention of the Soviet leadership. Such factors suggest the need to avoid stereotyped images of the Soviet threat and the Moscow-Peiping axis, and to be alert to changing conditions and new opportunities.

Accordingly, it is desirable that channels exist for communication with the Communist regimes. Regardless of what is done or not done on the specific question of recognition, the United States will have to have lines of communication open to the Government of Communist China because it wields power and controls territory that cannot be left out of account. If such a matter as the general control of armaments nears the point of international agreement, it will be imperative for Communist China to be brought in as a party.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE NATIONAL PURPOSE

The American people participate in foreign policy through their influence on the rest of the world, at a time when foreign relations go well beyond official diplomatic contacts between Governments, and through their influence on the policies of their own Government and the support which they give to those policies.

The impact of America on most other nations is made not solely or even primarily by official diplomacy but by the massive contact between peoples and cultures that is characteristic of this age: by the expansion of trade and other economic relations; by high-level visits and tourism on the grand scale; by the influence of the press, radio, and motion pictures; by the exchange of professors and students, books and ideas across national frontiers; and by the way in which America lives up to the ideals which it sets for itself, for example, in respect for human rights and for the principle of nondiscrimination.

These contacts and influences affect public attitudes in foreign countries and sometimes official attitudes and policies as well. They put our own society on display and on trial, as it never has been in the past, before millions all over the world. They will certainly have a bearing on the success of American foreign policy over the next decade. Above all, it is the conduct of American society itself which creates the image of America that is projected abroad and which affects our prestige and leadership.

Much of this nonofficial influence is, of course, beyond the power or the competence of the Government to control. As a free and pluralistic society America speaks not with one voice but with many. Not all its voices will be consistent with the policy of the day. In some ways that is a demonstration of our strength as a free society. In others it raises questions as to whether, as a nation, we know what we want and where

we are going. Where the Government can give guidance to this multiplicity of contacts, it should emphasize basic objectives and policies and also standards of personal and international conduct. Where it can properly do so, it should restrain or discourage those elements of the American impact abroad which are clearly harmful to relations with countries important to us or inconsistent with the requirements of leadership. For the rest it will have to depend on the knowledge and self-discipline of the American people themselves.

Even more important than the projection of an image of America abroad is the role of the people in relation to the making of basic policy and in giving it their support. The double series of challenge which this report has described, the Communist threat to the free nations and the manifold problems of a changing world, which at many points fuse into one, will make unprecedented demands upon the United States. However difficult it may be, a democracy such as ours must have the necessary foresight, the ability to organize its policy-making process, and the willingness to commit resources to policies the end results of which are far from clear and certainly unattainable in a short time. It must learn to expect some setbacks and losses, and not to be diverted by them from steady pursuit of the basic objectives. And over the long run the Government must obtain the continuing support of the American people for those objectives and for the policies that they demand—which points up the need for greater public understanding of our world position

and for a deeper sense of national purpose.

Through the working of our democratic institutions the people can make their voices heard and heeded on foreign as on domestic affairs; indeed, the two have become inextricably bound up together, and there are now few significant domestic measures that do not affect our foreign relations. Obviously, the people have only an indirect and occasional control over the conduct of foreign policy, but the major decisions, at least in their broad outline, are subject to the normal political process and require Congressional and public sanction either before or after they are taken. The Government must be generally responsive to public opinion. It cannot get too far ahead or too far behind. It works under a great handicap if the public is ill informed on the significant issues or if political leaders choose to play domestic politics with them.

Even with greater understanding of foreign affairs, however, will the American people support the necessary policies at the cost of greater sacrifice to themselves? There can be no doubt, we are convinced, of the need for the United States to devote more of its resources than in the past to purposes related to its objectives and its responsibilities in the world. There will be a need, as well, for adjustments in popular thinking, for a greater emphasis on general free world and regional aims rather than the more strictly national ones. Are the American people, now so absorbed in maintaining and enjoying their own material well-being, prepared to support such efforts and to make the necessary adjustments?

Are they sufficiently aware of the threats to the nation's future? Do they have a sense of great purpose, such as the nation had at earlier critical periods of its history?

We cannot claim special knowledge of what the American people will or will not do. We are disturbed over signs of a self-centered and short-sighted complacency in the national mood. We are persuaded, however, that with effective leadership the people can be counted on for greater efforts and sacrifices, provided that they have a conception of the immediate and the distant goals.

In war there was no question of their willingness to make sacrifices. In peacetime the American public has accepted the obligations and burdens that go with maintaining a military establishment of unprecedented size. It responded to the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe and to the needs for emergency and continuing assistance elsewhere. What it asks is that the assumption of burdens have some meaning, that it be related to historic and actual American ideals, and that it show a promise of results. For example, the idea of increased "foreign aid," essential though it may be, gets less and less public support in the absence of any clarification of objectives or any change in the prospects of positive and measurable success. The idea of a dramatic, large-scale common effort with other nations for economic development and progress in the entire free world, although more costly, should have a greater chance of evoking an enthusiastic response and continuing public support. The unlimited promise of scientific progress, together

with our demonstrated capacity to master it for human needs and welfare in many lands, offers a prospect of positive and effective action for which inspired leadership could hardly fail to call forth inspired popular effort.

Only with a sense of purpose, one that holds deep meaning for the American people but must be given voice by their elected leaders, can the Government of the United States set the goals of foreign policy and work out the means of attaining them. The role of leadership under our democratic form of government can hardly be overemphasized. In times like the present, when world affairs are infinitely complex and the dangers seem intangible or remote to so many it is a task far more difficult than in time of war.

One of the great virtues of the American system has been its power of adaptability to changing circumstances, its capacity to assimilate new ideas and to rise to the challenges of the time. But this is not automatic. The tendency toward relaxation of effort, which may be encouraged by a spurious atmosphere of "peace" or by the narrow concerns of domestic political advantages, must be countered by the far-sightedness and plain speaking of America's leaders.

The responsibility rests above all on the President, who alone can command the respectful attention of the entire nation and marshal nationwide support for sacrifices that the situation may demand. The Congress, and especially the Senate, also has a vital role to play in the enlightenment and guidance of public opinion.

Preserving and protecting our freedom and institutions are at the heart of the national purpose. The people should know the magnitude of the threats to their freedom, and that they will shirk the necessary measures to meet and dispel them only at great peril. But America would be blind so to limit its basic aims. It has accepted the fact that its own destiny as a nation depends on the survival and growth of freedom in the world. It must, then, express and pursue aims that respond to the deep aspirations of other peoples and enlist their co-operation, despite all differences of culture and historical experience. Self-interest alone, however enlightened, will not support a role of leadership in the world.

Power is a reality in the world politics of today. Diplomacy is an art that cannot be neglected. But leadership cannot rest solely on the strength of America's Armed Forces or on the skill of its diplomats. It must rest also on principle.

The United States should welcome the co-operation of the Communist powers toward these goals. If it is not forthcoming, as is likely, all the more reason for going ahead in association with nations of the free world, holding the door open but not vitiating the aims of policies or inviting their sabotage for the sake of gaining the participation of those who reject them. For the goals must

remain clear enough to sustain their meaning for the American people and for other peoples of the free world.

The United States should represent and set for itself a positive ideal, the ideal of a world not only safer and saner but also one in which basic human needs are met and human values can flourish; a world no longer under threat of nuclear devastation; a world in which broader international authority and institutions can grow as they are needed; a world that, using to the full the fruits of scientific advance, offers expanding productivity and a life more worth living for the millions who find no escape from poverty and the millions more who have begun to climb the ladder but are still looking upward.

If the American people have shown a genius in their own history, it is in the development of political institutions balancing essential freedom and necessary authority, and in the creation of material wealth on a broad basis without coercion. Surely, if we can see the meaning of our national experience in relation to the broader and changing world scene, the goals for the future become clear. The basic challenge is whether we as a people can move toward them with the urgency, the vigor, and the understanding of humanity's needs which are so obviously demanded by the times in which we live.

Member Nations of the UN

<i>Country</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Area (sq.mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Admitted to UN</i>
<i>Africa—South of the Sahara</i>				
Cameroon	Yaounde	166,800	3,200,000 (1957)	9/20/60
Central African Republic	Bangui	238,000	1,134,400	9/20/60
Chad	Fort Lamy	496,000	2,581,100	9/20/60
Congo, Republic of the (former Belgian)	Leopoldville	904,900	13,900,000 (1960)	9/20/60
Congo Republic (former French Congo)	Brazzaville, Pointe Noire	132,000	759,700	9/20/60
Dahomey	Porto-Novo	43,784	2,000,000	9/20/60
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	350,000	12,200,000 (1960)	11/13/45
Gabon	Libreville	103,000	406,000 (1960)	9/20/60
Ghana	Accra	91,840	4,908,000 (1960)	3/8/57
Guinea	Conakry	96,360	2,500,000 (1958)	12/12/58
Ivory Coast	Abidjan	123,282	3,100,000 (1958)	9/20/60
Liberia	Monrovia	43,000	1,320,000 (1960)	11/2/45
Malagasy (Madagascar)	Tananarive	227,800	5,700,000 (1959)	9/20/60
Mali Republic	Bamako	460,540	3,708,000 (1958)	9/28/60
Niger	Niamey	494,633	2,800,000 (1958)	9/20/60
Nigeria	Lagos	373,250	34,060,000 (1960)	10/1/60
Senegal	Dakar	80,617	2,364,000 (1960)	9/28/60
Somalia	Mogadiscio	266,000	1,900,000	9/20/60
Sudan	Khartoum	967,500	10,000,000 (1956)	11/12/56
Togo	Lome	22,000	1,200,000	9/20/60
Union of South Africa	Pretoria	472,360	14,960,000 (1960)	11/7/45
Upper Volta	Ouagadougou	105,946	4,000,000	9/20/60
<i>Asia and South East Asia</i>				
Afghanistan	Kabul	250,000	12,000,000	11/19/46
Burma	Rangoon	261,610	21,510,000 (1960)	4/19/48
Cambodia	Phnom Penh	70,000	4,950,000 (1960)	12/14/55
Ceylon	Colombo	25,400	9,400,000	12/14/55
China (Formosa)	Taipei	13,886	9,506,000	10/24/45
India	New Delhi	1,221,023	416,000,000 (1960)	10/30/45
Indonesia	Jakarta	573,479	90,700,000 (1960)	9/28/50
Japan	Tokyo	142,644	90,900,000 (1957)	12/18/56
Laos	Vientiane	91,428	1,570,000 (1960)	12/14/55
Malaya	Kuala Lumpur	50,690	6,276,915 (1959)	9/17/57
Nepal	Katmandu	54,000	8,431,540 (1955)	12/14/55
Pakistan	Karachi	364,737	90,650,000 (1960)	9/30/47
Philippines	Quezon City (Luzon)	115,600	24,000,000 (1958)	10/24/45
Thailand	Bangkok	198,747	23,740,000 (1960)	12/16/46

<i>Country</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Area</i> (sq.mi.)	<i>Population</i>	<i>Admitted</i> <i>to UN</i>
<i>Latin America</i>				
Argentina	Buenos Aires	1,072,477	20,770,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Bolivia	La Paz	404,388	3,880,000 (1960)	11/14/45
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	3,287,195	66,090,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Chile	Santiago	286,397	7,121,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Colombia	Bogotá	439,519	15,320,000 (1960)	11/5/45
Costa Rico	San José	19,653	1,035,000 (1957)	11/2/45
Cuba	Havana	44,206	6,840,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Dominican Republic	Ciudad Trujillo	18,711	2,698,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Ecuador	Quito	104,506	4,230,000 (1960)	12/21/45
El Salvador	San Salvador	8,259	2,348,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Guatemala	Guatemala City	42,042	3,430,000 (1957)	11/21/45
Haiti	Port-au-Prince	10,714	3,384,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	43,227	1,769,000 (1957)	12/17/45
Mexico	Mexico City	760,373	33,710,000 (1960)	11/7/45
Nicaragua	Managua	57,145	1,331,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Panama	Panama	28,752	1,040,000 (1960)	11/13/45
Paraguay	Asunción	157,039	1,638,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Peru	Lima	506,000	11,190,000 (1960)	10/31/45
Uruguay	Montevideo	72,172	2,650,000 (1956)	12/18/45
Venezuela	Caracas	352,143	6,680,000 (1960)	11/15/45

Middle East and North Africa

Iran	Tehran	634,000	20,520,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Iraq	Baghdad	175,000	6,538,100 (1957)	12/21/45
Israel	Jerusalem	8,048	1,979,933 (1958)	5/11/49
Jordan	Amman, Jerusalem	37,500	1,500,000 (1950)	12/14/55
Lebanon	Beirut	1,400	1,400,000 (1956)	10/24/45
Libya	Tripoli, Benghazi	680,000	1,200,000 (1958)	12/14/55
Morocco	Rabat	169,000	10,750,000 (1960)	11/12/56
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	870,000	7,000,000 (1952)	10/24/45
Tunisia	Tunis	48,310	3,880,000 (1958)	11/12/56
Turkey	Ankara	294,502	27,570,000 (1960)	10/24/45
United Arab Re- public	Cairo	458,192	28,108,000 (1958)	10/24/45
Yemen	Sana, Jaiz	75,000	4,500,000 (1953)	9/30/47

Communist States of East Europe

Albania	Tirana	10,500	1,421,000 (1956)	12/14/55
Bulgaria	Sofia	42,796	7,880,000 (1960)	12/14/55
Byelorussia (White Russia)	Minsk	80,154	8,000,000 (1956)	10/24/45
Czechoslovakia	Prague	49,300	13,710,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Hungary	Budapest	35,902	9,978,000 (1960)	12/14/55
Poland	Warsaw	120,355	29,990,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Rumania	Bucharest	91,660	17,829,000 (1957)	12/14/55
Soviet Union	Moscow	8,700,000	213,000,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Ukraine	Kiev	232,664	40,600,000 (1956)	10/24/45
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	99,181	18,200,000 (1958)	10/24/45

Countries Usually Associated with the West

Australia	Canberra	2,974,581	9,896,529 (1958)	11/1/45
Austria	Vienna	32,369	6,997,000 (1957)	12/14/55

<i>Country</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Area</i> (sq.mi.)	<i>Population</i>	<i>Admitted</i> <i>to UN</i>
Belgium	Brussels	11,775	8,989,000 (1957)	12/27/45
Britain	London	93,983	52,180,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Canada	Ottawa	3,851,113	17,508,000 (1960)	11/9/45
Cyprus	Nicosia	3,572	560,000 (1960)	9/20/60
Denmark	Copenhagen	16,576	4,500,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Finland	Helsinki	130,127	4,480,000 (1960)	12/14/55
France	Paris	213,100	44,000,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Greece	Athens	51,168	8,050,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Iceland	Reykjavik	39,758	173,000 (1960)	11/19/46
Ireland	Dublin	26,600	2,885,000 (1957)	12/14/55
Italy	Rome	116,303	48,353,000 (1957)	12/14/55
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	999	314,000 (1957)	10/24/45
Netherlands	Amsterdam	12,850	11,095,721 (1958)	12/10/45
New Zealand	Wellington	103,736	2,370,000 (1960)	10/24/45
Norway	Oslo	125,064	3,500,000 (1957)	11/27/45
Portugal	Lisbon	35,466	8,909,000 (1957)	12/14/55
Spain	Madrid	195,504	29,970,000 (1960)	12/14/55
Sweden	Stockholm	173,378	7,395,000 (1958)	11/19/46
United States	Washington	3,615,210	180,850,000 (1960)	10/24/45

Independent Countries Outside the UN.

People's Republic of China	Peiping		668,000,000 (1960)
Outer Mongolia	Ulan Bator	580,000	1,070,000 (1960)
Switzerland	Berne	15,944	5,117,000 (1957)
East Germany	East Berlin	41,645	17,832,200 (1957)
West Germany (Including West Berlin and Saar)	Bonn	95,918	51,469,000 (1957)
North Korea	Pyongyang	43,812	24,240,000 (1960)
South Korea	Seoul	38,452	22,250,000 (1957)
North Vietnam	Hanoi	63,384	15,817,000 (1960)
South Vietnam	Saigon	65,000	12,000,000 (1956)

Countries in Africa Probably Destined for Independence in 1961 or Later

Algeria	Algiers	852,600	10,720,000 (1960)
Gambia	Bathurst	4,005	297,000 (1960)
Kenya	Nairobi	224,960	6,540,000 (1960)
Mauritania *	Nouakchott	418,120	648,000 (1960)
Nyasaland	Zomba	49,000	2,710,000
Rhodesia	Salisbury	440,330	4,940,000 (1958)
Ruanda-Urundi	Usumbura	20,900	4,790,000 (1960)
Sierra Leone	Freetown	27,925	2,100,000
Somaliland (Br.)	Hargeisa	68,000	552,000 (1960)
Somaliland (Fr.)	Djibouti	9,070	67,000 (1957)
Tanganyika	Dar es Salaam	362,680	9,150,000 (1960)
Uganda	Entebbe	93,980	5,920,000 (1960)

* To become independent November 28, 1960. Will probably become the hundredth member of the UN.

DISARMAMENT

—The Key Issue

The top issue before the present session of the UN General Assembly is disarmament, the subject of four separate items of the approved docket.

Disarmament is truly the most difficult and the most urgent of all the world's problems. Achieving disarmament is the equivalent of assuring peace. In this day of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, when we discuss disarmament we are talking about the survival of our civilization.

The question of disarmament, in reference both to conventional armaments and to nuclear weapons, has been before the UN since the first session of the General Assembly. The principal developments in the various and prolonged disarmament discussions are listed here:

- 1946 Jan. —UN General Assembly unanimously approves creation of Atomic Energy Commission.
- 1946 June —U.S. submits "Baruch Plan" for international control of atomic energy. U.S. at the time was the sole producer of atomic energy.
—Soviet Union urges a ban on production and use of atomic weapons.
- 1948 May —Atomic Energy Commission reports no progress: Soviet Union rejects international control of atomic energy. Discussions deadlocked.
- 1949 Sept. —West reports atomic bomb explosion by Soviet Union.
- 1952 Jan. —UN General Assembly dissolves Atomic Energy Commission, establishes Disarmament Commission composed of members of Security Council and Canada, when that country is not a member of the Council. Disarmament Subcommittee set up consisting of U.S., Canada, Britain, France, and Soviet Union.
- 1953 Aug. —Soviet Union explodes hydrogen bomb.
- 1953 Dec. —President Eisenhower presents "Atoms for Peace" Plan, proposing International Atomic Agency under UN for development and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Plan thwarted when Soviet Union insisted on putting Agency under Security Council where veto is operative.
- 1954 June —Britain and France place before Special Disarmament Subcommittee a proposal for reduction of armaments by stages under careful control, aiming at elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Proposal recommends 1953 levels for military manpower and spending, with identical ceiling of 1 million to 1.5 million men for U.S., Soviet Union, and China, and of 700 thousand to 800 thousand men for Britain and France. Soviet Union rejects Western proposal, recommends a percentage reduction on basis of actual 1953 levels (when U.S.S.R. had more men under arms than any Western power).
- 1954 Oct. —Soviet Union agrees that a ban on nuclear weapons should be simultaneous with the initiation of controls—as the West insists.

1955 May

—Soviet resolution submitted to Disarmament Commission links disarmament to demilitarization of West Germany. New proposal (1) would freeze armaments in all countries (including West Germany which has none) at 1954 levels; (2) would ban all hydrogen and atom bomb tests in 1956; (3) and, in 1957, would stop the production of nuclear weapons, would limit forces of U.S., the Soviet Union, and Communist China to 1 million to 1.5 million men each, and would require the liquidation of all military bases abroad. The Soviet proposal would also set up an international control agency for carrying out these measures, reporting to the Security Council where each of the great powers has a veto. In submitting the resolution, the Soviet Union abandoned its former insistence on having more troops and more conventional weapons than the U.S., and on the immediate destruction of all nuclear weapons.

1955 July

—At the Summit Conference in Geneva, President Eisenhower introduces his “open skies” proposal for mutual air inspection, offering to exchange military maps and air survey facilities with the Soviet Union.

1955 Nov.

—At Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva, all four delegations (Britain, France, Soviet Union, U.S.) agree on need for disarmament but disagree as to methods. The Soviet Union calls for immediate ban on nuclear weapons with effective controls (without specifying the kinds of disarmament supervision it would accept). Britain, France, and the U.S. agree but insist that detailed work on controls and inspection must come first. All four nations accept in general the “open skies” plan. Since no progress is made beyond agreement on principles, the question of disarmament is referred again to the UN Special Subcommittee on Disarmament.

1955 Dec.

—Soviet Union rejects the “open skies” proposal.

1956 March

—In a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin, President Eisenhower calls for freezing of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and urges negotiations for reduction and control of armaments outside the nuclear field.
—At Disarmament Subcommittee meeting in London, France and Britain introduce a synthesis of U.S. and Soviet recommendations providing a three-stage disarmament schedule: (1) preliminary UN control and inspection with freeze on existing armaments; (2) reduction of conventional forces halfway to an agreed-upon base and limitation of all nuclear tests; (3) reduction of armaments to agreed-upon levels and a “moral ban” on manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. U.S. favors stage one, is cool toward stages two and three. Later in the meeting of the subcommittee, France revises its stand in favor of linking disarmament and German reunification.

1956 May

—UN Disarmament Subcommittee talks end in collapse because of Soviet rejection of foolproof controls and of preliminary steps urged by the U.S. The 4 Western participants (Britain, Canada, France, and the U.S.) issue a statement outlining the proposals they made during the conference which emphasized the concurrent development of controls with inspection and the stage-by-stage reduction of armaments including nuclear weapons.

1956 June

—Soviet Premier Bulganin calls upon Western powers to match the Soviet Union’s announced reduction of armed forces and to reduce their forces in Germany. The Western powers state that they will not participate in “uninspected disarmament.”

November 1960

1956 July

- UN Disarmament Commission meets in New York. West introduces resolution calling for disarmament by stages with effective controls. Soviet resolution calls for a solemn agreement by nations both in and out of the UN to refrain from the use or threat of force and to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. France suggests that aerial inspection be tried out in sensitive sectors along Soviet borders and in an area of equal size in the United States. Russian representative agrees to first stage limitation of armed forces, calls for complete and unconditional banning of nuclear weapons—destruction of existing stocks, cessation of production, stopping of tests. He also declares that aerial inspection is worthless and that limited ground inspection is an adequate control system. The Western nations are unanimous in rejecting the Soviet view of adequate controls.
- Soviet Foreign Minister proposes a British-Soviet-U.S. agreement to ban atomic tests as a first step toward a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.
- British Prime Minister declares that Britain is ready to limit hydrogen bomb tests apart from other disarmament agreements.

1956 Aug.

- U.S. declines Soviet Premier Bulganin's call for reduction of forces in East and West Germany.

1956 Nov.

- The Soviet Government submits revised disarmament proposals to Britain, France, India, and the U.S.: (1) to reduce within 2 years U.S., Soviet, and (Red) Chinese armed forces to 1 million to 1.5 million men, and British and French forces to 650 thousand men; (2) to ban nuclear weapons and destroy nuclear stockpiles within 2 years, and to stop nuclear weapon testing at once; (3) to reduce by one third British, French, Soviet, and U.S. forces in Germany; (4) to reduce U.S., British, and French forces in NATO countries, and Soviet forces in Warsaw Pact nations; (5) to liquidate within 2 years all "defense" bases in territories of other states; (6) to establish effective international supervision and control of disarmament with ground observation posts; (7) to explore feasibility of aerial inspection to a depth of 800 kilometers east and west of the Iron Curtain; (8) to conclude a nonaggression pact between NATO powers and those of the Warsaw Treaty; (9) to call a conference of heads of government of Britain, France, India, Soviet Union, and United States.

1956 Dec.

- U.S. (and later France and Britain) declines five-power disarmament conference. U.S. suggests that Soviet proposals could be considered in UN Disarmament Subcommittee.

1957 Jan.

- In UN General Assembly Political Committee the U.S. proposes: (1) an agreement for assigning all future production of fissionable materials to nonmilitary purposes; (2) to limit and ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapon tests; (3) to move toward a first-stage reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces (2.5 million men for U.S. and U.S.S.R., 750 thousand for Britain and France). U.S. declares that effective inspection would require both appropriate aerial inspection and ground observers at key locations, and proposes the progressive installation of inspection systems to reduce to a minimum the possibility of surprise attack.

1957 April

- At UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting in London, U.S. proposes: (1) a two-stage reduction of conventional armaments, first

by 10 per cent, then by 15 per cent; (2) a five-stage plan for controlling nuclear weapons—after an adequate inspection plan is put into effect.

- The Soviet Union presents its proposals to Disarmament Subcommittee: (1) two-stage reduction of armed forces to levels used in Soviet recommendations of preceding November, with control posts at key points; (2) renunciation of all types of nuclear weapons; (3) reduction of forces in Germany; (4) selected liquidation of foreign military bases; (5) aerial inspection over area including most of Western Europe, all of Alaska, all of United States west of the Mississippi, most of the Soviet satellites, a narrow fringe of Russia's western border, and eastern one third of Russia-Siberia.

1957 May

- Britain offers Disarmament Subcommittee proposals for (1) advance registration of nuclear weapon tests with international observation; (2) a committee of experts to consider methods of limiting tests; (3) the eventual banning of nuclear weapon production and testing.
- U.S. Secretary of State Dulles recommends that at present consideration be given to aerial inspection in arctic area (principally Alaska and Siberia). Soviet Union is cool to the idea.

1957 June

- Soviet delegate at Disarmament Subcommittee proposes: (1) the cessation of all nuclear tests for two or three years; (2) setting up control posts in U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, and the Pacific area. French delegate points out that France, not yet a nuclear power, would not be bound by any agreement between the 3 nuclear powers to stop tests.
- United States submits series of recommendations to Disarmament Subcommittee for the implementation of its disarmament proposals in both the conventional and nuclear fields.

1957 July

- U.S. also proposes that nuclear weapons tests be halted for 10 months and that the period be extended if inspection systems can be established and the production of nuclear weapons can be stopped.
- Soviet delegate (to Disarmament Subcommittee) declares that the U.S. proposal for halting of nuclear weapon tests and banning nuclear arms production could be considered only if these agreements were preceded by a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in warfare. He criticizes the proposed 10-month test suspension and repeats the Soviet demand for a ban on testing of 2 or 3 years.

1957 Aug.

- In UN Disarmament Subcommittee, Mr. Dulles presents joint U.S.-British-French-Canadian proposals for air and ground inspection in three continents: (1) all of Canada, continental U.S., Soviet Union, Alaska, and Europe to northern portions of Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey; or (2) an alternate zone embracing all territory north of the Arctic Circle; or (3) a still more reduced area to be negotiated.
- The Soviet Union rejects the West's inspection plan.
- The 4 Western powers present, in the Disarmament Subcommittee, an 11-point comprehensive "working paper" for a first-step disarmament treaty with sweeping concessions to Soviet views. Plan calls for an international control organization under UN Security Council.
- The "working paper" is immediately rejected by the Soviet delegate.

November 1960

About Books



Parties and Politics in America, by Clinton Rossiter. Cornell University Press, 1960. 205 pp. with index. \$2.85; paper, \$1.65.

Here is a present and useful election year reading for every American citizen who wants to have a far better-than-average understanding of what is going on this fall.

Dr. Rossiter, well-known political scientist and historian, is professor of the American Institute at Cornell University. Among his widely read previous books are *Seedtime of the Republic*, *Conservatism in America*, and *The American Presidency*.

The scope of the book is suggested by the five chapter titles: The Pattern of American Politics, The Function of American Parties, Democrats and Republicans: Who Are They? Democrats or Republicans: What Difference Does It Make? The Future of American Politics.

This is a forthright and objective account of American party politics. "Nowhere in the world," says Dr. Rossiter, "even in the nightmares of our friendly critics from abroad, is there a pattern of politics anything like ours." His language is vivid and vigorous as he clarifies the pattern, finding in its durability "a cause of modest rejoicing rather than of gnawing frustration."

Dr. Rossiter regards the two principal parties as useful, effective, and altogether indispensable instruments

of constitutional democracy. He undertakes a critical analysis of each party, examining its strength, origin, development, achievements, failures. The real difference between the two parties he finds to be one of tendencies rather than principles.

Dr. Rossiter looks ahead, discussing what is likely to happen and what ought to happen on the American political scene. He foresees that in the next twenty-five years the parties will remain loose, supple, overlapping, decentralized, undisciplined, interest-directed, and principle-shunning.

This is a presentation of the hard facts of political life in the United States by an expert who writes with critical affection and admiration.

Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People, by Alexander Meiklejohn. Harper & Brothers, 1960. 166 pp. \$3.50.

This valuable book incorporates and expands a previous book, published in 1948, on *Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government*, which is still regarded as an important contribution to political science.

The author has served as Dean of Brown University, President of Amherst College, and Chairman of the School for Social Studies in San Francisco.

The author distinguishes between freedom of speech in private affairs

and freedom of speech upon public issues. He points out that we can seriously restrict the latter freedom in a way that prevents public discussion and enlightenment on matters of social importance. He applies his thesis to several specific legal cases involving academic freedom, Congressional investigations, the integrity of our universities.

The book will be an indispensable reference for all who are interested in the preservation of the basic right of free speech in a democracy.

The present volume includes a fifteen-page foreword by Malcolm Sharp, of the Law School of the University of Chicago.

Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age as Expressed in His Writings, edited by Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. 364 pp. with index. \$6.50.

This extremely useful volume is based on sixteen of Dr. Niebuhr's books and some 170 of his articles. The material is selected, gathered, and put together so as to form a logical whole. The entire text represents the writing of Dr. Niebuhr. The original source of each excerpt is faithfully recorded in notes at the end of the volume. Some of the chapter headings suggest the range of the writing: The Contemporary Crisis; The Soft Utopians: Liberalism; The Hard Utopians: Communism; The Relevance of Christian Realism: An Orientation; Human Nature and the Will-to-Power; Groups in the Struggle for Power; The Problem of the Love Ethic in Politics; The Case

Against Pacifism; Love, Justice and the Question of Natural Law; Government and the Strategy of Democracy; The Christian in Politics; The Problem of Economic Power; The Problem of Race Relations; The Soviet Threat; Foreign Policy and World Responsibility; Faith for a Hazardous Future.

Dr. Niebuhr's eminence as a theologian is matched now by his reputation as a political theorist. Increasingly he is cited, reprinted, and politically analyzed by students of international relations and political theory.

Dr. Davis is professor of government at Beloit College, and Dr. Good is assistant professor of international relations at the University of Denver. They have done a significant service in preparing this volume.

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, by Hans J. Morgenthau. Third Edition. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960. 630 pp. plus index.

This book is a major rewriting and expanding of material contained in the earlier editions of 1948 and 1954. In the process of testing his theory of international politics, which emphasizes realism, in the light of changes in the political environment since the second edition was published, Dr. Morgenthau has felt the need to change the emphasis here and there while leaving the basic assumptions and tenets, and the theoretical structure intact.

The ten parts of the book discuss: (1) Theory and Practice of International Politics, (2) International Politics as a Struggle for Power,

- Soviet Premier presents to UN General Assembly a call for general and complete disarmament within 4 years. If not feasible, then partial disarmament on basis of Soviet proposals of May, 1955. Soviet proposal for complete disarmament includes three stages: (1) reduction of armed forces to previously suggested levels, (2) completion of liquidation of armed forces by all states, and (3) destruction of all types of nuclear and rocket weapons.

1959 Oct.

- Three-power conference on suspension of nuclear weapon tests resumes in Geneva.

1959 Nov.

- UN General Assembly approves three resolutions on disarmament: (1) requesting France to refrain from atomic bomb test in Sahara; (2) referring British and Soviet disarmament proposals to the new 10-nation committee; (3) endorsing first proposal asking the new 10-nation group to study ways of preventing more states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- UN General Assembly approves two further resolutions: (4) calling on all states to refrain from tests pending attempts of nuclear powers to reach agreements on cessation of tests; (5) calling on U.S., Britain, and Soviet Union to speed on agreement banning nuclear weapon tests under appropriate controls.
- Conference of experts from U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union on ways to detect underground nuclear explosions opens in Geneva. No agreement is reached on a code for deciding when an unidentified earth tremor could be labeled a possible bomb test eligible for on-the-spot inspection.

1959 Dec.

- Antarctic treaty signed in Washington by 12 countries, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union, assuring the peaceful use and development of the area.
- UN General Assembly sets up a permanent twenty-four-nation outer space committee: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Soviet Union, United Arab Republic, U.S.
- U.S. announces it will not extend voluntary ban on nuclear weapon tests.

1960 Jan.

- Communist China Foreign Minister declares that an international disarmament agreement arrived at "without formal participation and the signature of the representatives of the People's Republic of China, cannot have any binding force on China." On same day, U.S. Secretary of State states that Communist Chinese participation is "inevitable" if a disarmament agreement is to be concluded between East and West.

1960 Feb.

- In Geneva talks on nuclear test ban, U.S. submits a plan in attempt to break deadlock. Proposal calls for treaty banning all nuclear tests in atmosphere, in the ocean, and in space where agreed controls could now be applied. Underground tests, except undetectable small-scale explosions, could be banned. Soviet Union rejects the proposal.
- French explode plutonium bomb in Sahara, making France the fourth atomic power.

1960 March

- Soviet Union says it is ready to accept U.S. proposal to ban all major nuclear tests if West would agree to a moratorium on all underground explosions for military purposes.

- Ten-nation disarmament conference opens in Geneva. Western group of 5 nations submit a three-stage program: (1) creation of an international control organization, limitation of U.S. and Soviet armed forces to 2.5 million men each, reduction of conventional armaments by all participating countries, studies to work out other disarmament problems; (2) expanding control of both conventional and nuclear weapons, halting of nuclear weapon production, involving Communist China in disarmament negotiations; (3) almost complete disarmament under an international enforcement agency. Eastern bloc submits Soviet proposals made in UN General Assembly in September, 1959.
- Soviet Union rejects Western proposal to negotiate powers to be given an international disarmament agency, insists that disarmament measures should be decided before controls. West declares it cannot agree to disarmament steps without analyzing each step in terms of inspection and control. This continues to be the central issue in the 10-nation disarmament discussions.
- U.S. and Britain, in Eisenhower-Macmillan declaration, state they are willing to join Soviet Union on moratorium on underground tests if there can be agreement on a system of inspection and control. Soviet Union says that the Eisenhower-Macmillan statement is encouraging.
- Soviet Premier states that he sees no common ground between the Western and Soviet proposals before the 10-nation disarmament conference in Geneva.

1960 April

- Western powers at Geneva talks reject Soviet proposal for complete disarmament as a basis for disarmament compromise. Soviet Union rejects West's proposals as a basis for continued negotiation.
- Soviet Union introduces at Geneva 10-nation conference a new disarmament proposal based (presumably) on UN resolution of November, 1959. Western bloc rejects Soviet plan.
- President de Gaulle of France declares that nuclear disarmament, not tests, is the paramount issue.
- U.S. offers the 10-nation disarmament conference to ban production of nuclear weapons and to open nuclear plants to inspection if U.S.S.R. will do the same. Soviet Union rejects U.S. proposal.
- U.S. submits to the 10-nation conference a plan for verification of reduction of armed forces. Western powers submit their basic conditions for total disarmament.
- Ten-nation disarmament conference recesses.

1960 May

- Soviet Union (at the 202d meeting of the U.S.-British-Soviet nuclear test ban conference in Geneva) accepts U.S.-British proposal that trial nuclear tests be carried out as part of a joint research program on detection of small underground explosions. Conference recesses for summit meeting.
- Soviet Premier announces that a U.S. military observation plane was shot down over Soviet territory.
- U.S. says it will resume underground nuclear tests.
- East-West summit conference in Paris collapses.
- Three-power nuclear test ban conference resumes in Geneva. Soviet says its observers at U.S. test sites must have right to look inside nuclear devices.

1960 June

- New Soviet disarmament plan distributed to all UN members. Proposal involves several steps: destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons; liquidation of military bases in foreign coun-

- tries; banning of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; abolition of all armies and bases; a UN force to police disarmament.
- U.S. note declares U.S. will give the Soviet plan careful and serious study.
- Ten-nation disarmament conference resumes meetings in Geneva. New Soviet plan introduced. West rejects Soviet proposal for a ban on all means of delivering nuclear weapons.
- U.S. submits revised proposals to allies at Geneva 10-nation meeting, but Soviet Union breaks off the negotiations before the plan can be presented. U.S. denounces Soviet withdrawal from the discussions.
- Soviet Union accuses U.S. of responsibility for deadlock in the 10-nation conference.

1960 July

- Communist China tells Soviet Union that only way to achieve disarmament is by ceaselessly increasing the might of the Soviet camp and forcing the UN and the West to accept its plans.
- At their power nuclear test ban conference, U.S. proposes to pool, with Russians, nuclear devices of older design to be used in a coordinated research program for the improvement of underground detection methods. U.S. also submits proposals dealing with on-site inspections of suspicious earth tremors above a threshold equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb explosion.
- U.S. announces plans for 11 small underground nuclear explosions in next 2 years, as well as 21 underground explosions with conventional nonatomic materials.
- Soviet Union rejects U.S. proposal for pool of nuclear devices for research purposes.
- At nuclear test ban conference, Soviet Union proposes (for first time) a definite number of veto-free on-the-spot inspections of suspicious seismic events: 3 inspections by West in the Soviet Union, 6 inspections by Soviet Union in the West—3 in the U.S., and 3 in Britain. Quota proposed by West is 20 in the West and 20 in the Soviet Union.

1960 Aug.

- West rejects Soviet inspection quotas.
- U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, at the nuclear test ban conference in Geneva, agree on a definition of the threshold for a permanent test ban at a seismic magnitude of 4.75—corresponding probably to the strength of the Hiroshima explosion. Above this level, test explosion would be banned; below it, there would be a moratorium. Russian and American scientists disagree widely as to size of explosion that would produce a 4.75 reading.
- Soviet Union rejects plan of calling UN Disarmament Commission into session; urges instead a meeting of heads of government of 82 member nations when UN General Assembly meets in September.
- Chou-Lu-Lai, of Communist China, calls for a treaty with the U.S. banning nuclear weapons in a zone to be defined in Asia.
- UN Disarmament Commission convenes. U.S. proposes to shut down production of fissionable materials and to set aside 66,000 pounds for peaceful uses if U.S.S.R. will do the same. Soviet Union rejects both proposals, Commission thus calls for resumption of East-West disarmament talks as early as possible.
- The 3-power nuclear test ban talks in Geneva are adjourned until October.
- U.S. pledges Britain not to resume underground tests until after elections.

1960 Sept.



- U.S. announces new disarmament administration to co-ordinate U.S. policy on disarmament.
- Fifteenth UN General Assembly convenes in New York attended by 23 heads of states and 57 foreign ministers. President Eisenhower calls for resumption of disarmament negotiations to deal particularly with threat of "war by miscalculation" and the danger of "mounting nuclear weapon stockpiles." Soviet Premier Khrushchev calls again for "general and complete" disarmament, proposes a treaty essentially the same as proposal of June, 1960.
- Canadian and Danish representatives in UN General Assembly offer to open their arctic regions to inspection if U.S.S.R. does the same.
- Soviet Premier, in letter to members of the special ten-nation disarmament commission, which recessed in frustration in June, calls for addition of 5 "neutral" nations (Ghana, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United Arab Republic).
- Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain, in address to UN General Assembly, suggests a study by technical experts of practicability of disarmament. Their report would enable statesmen "to translate into action what the technicians say is technically possible."
- Urgency of disarmament issue is repeatedly stressed in addresses to UN General Assembly by representatives of member nations, including several heads of governments.
- Three-power nuclear test ban conference reopens in Geneva. U.S. proposes 27-month moratorium on small underground test explosions—to be effective after signing of treaty outlawing all nuclear tests except smaller underground explosions. Britain proposes a three-phase plan for world network of 180 control posts (10 on ships) to police nuclear test ban. Soviet delegate claims that 21 control posts assigned to Soviet territory are too many.

1960 Oct.

- Senator Humphrey (chairman of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament) declares that U.S. should resume testing if no test ban treaty is reached by June, 1961.
- Soviet Union, in 3-power talks in Geneva, says U.S. offer for 27-month moratorium on small underground nuclear tests is too short, calls for moratorium of 4 or 5 years.
- Various disarmament proposals before UN General Assembly referred to the Political Committee (of the General Assembly) over Soviet protests.
- U.S., Britain, and France submit joint proposals to the Political Committee. Differ from Soviet plan mainly in recommending that negotiations start on measures capable of early implementation with controls, rather than on sweeping proposals for general and complete disarmament.
- Soviet Union, in Political Committee, threatens boycott if the committee "wastes time" discussing "futile" Western proposals.

Disarmament continues to be the priority issue before the United Nations as well as in East-West relations. SOCIAL PROGRESS will continue to report developments. For much of the information in the above summary of disarmament negotiations we are indebted to Deadline Data.

About Books



The United States and the United Nations: Volume I—The Public View, 1945-1955, by William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey. Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. 314 pp. with index. \$3.00.

The United States and the United Nations: Volume II—Promoting the Public Welfare, Examples of American Cooperation, 1945-1955, by L. K. Hyde, Jr. Manhattan Publishing Company, 1960. 249 pp. with index. \$3.00.

These useful books for students of international affairs and also for United Nations fans are the first two volumes of a series of national studies on international organization undertaken by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The first volume is an empirical study of American public attitudes concerning international organization from 1942 through 1954. Of particular interest are the charts which graphically explore popular feelings of satisfaction and disappointment with the United Nations in the context of major political advance in the first ten years of its history. The authors of this book are connected with the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

The second book discusses U.S. policies in the UN on economic and social questions. These policies reflect the traits of the American char-

acter and the unique experience of the American people. The book is based upon the premise that the UN is one of the many channels for the expression of American national interest, and as such should be used as wisely as possible.

The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History, by W. W. Rostow. Harper & Brothers, 1960. 568 pp. with index. \$8.75.

The author of this solid and challenging book is one of our country's foremost political economists—Dr. W. W. Rostow, Professor of Economic History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Director of The American Project of The Center for International Studies there. The impressive subject of the book is the nature of the American society and our behavior (past, present, and probably future) in dealing with world affairs.

Dr. Rostow identifies a *national style*, a characteristic way of approaching and dealing with, or ignoring, the nation's problems.

The book is organized into six main sections. In the first section he analyzes the patterns of our past performance in such periods as the Civil War, the Reconstruction, the First World War, and the great depression of the 30's. The next three sections present probably the most searching analysis in print of America's role in

world affairs over the last twenty-five years. In the last two sections he discusses prospects and problems facing us in the future and presents the outline of an American agenda. The author sees a need for radical change in our habits in dealing with international problems and considers the kind of leadership that the new day requires.

This is a bold and very useful book at a time when the United States faces new tasks in the world arena.

Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades of Inter-American Relations, 1930-1960, by Donald M. Dozer. University of Florida Press, 1959. 456 pp. with index. \$8.00.

This important book seems to be "must" reading for those who would like to understand America's present dilemmas and opportunities in its relations with all the countries in Latin America, including not least of all Cuba. A careful study of this readable book helps one to understand a little better the paradoxes, ambiguities, and frustrations of our relations with a man like Fidel Castro.

For the years 1933-1945, Dr. Dozer sets up a model and lays a firm foundation for studies of both subsequent and previous periods in inter-American relations. For the period since 1945 the author presents abundant evidence to explain the deterioration that has occurred in our relations with the vast area south of the border. One would suppose that no other volume deals so fully and carefully with the record, and the author is to be thanked for his careful and arduous work.

Dr. Dozer, well-known in historical circles for his many articles on American foreign policy and historical subjects, was for many years connected with the State Department where he was concerned with Latin-American relations. He has taught at Boston University, Harvard, Radcliffe, the University of Maryland, and the American University in Washington.

Democracy Is Not Enough: A Personal Survey of the Hungry World, by John Scott. Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1960. 186 pp. \$3.95.

The author of this excellent and most readable book is a reporter of vast experience in world-wide news interpretation, special assistant to the publisher of *Time* magazine. He has served as a *Time* correspondent and representative both in the Orient and in Europe, and is widely known as an expert on Russia.

The book begins with insightful comments on four controversial words—colonialism, nationalism, communism, socialism. He then presents recollections of five years of constant travel in the hungry world of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. He describes the various sizes and stripes of nationalism in Bolivia, South Africa, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, and India.

The last half of the book is devoted to a discussion of why democracy is not enough, but must be accompanied by economic and social development, the nature and extent of the communist challenge in the underdeveloped areas of the world, and certain problems of United

States relations with the areas of rapid change.

Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union, by Arnold Kramish. Stanford University Press, 1959. 232 pp. with index. \$4.75.

Radiation, Genes, and Man, by Bruce Wallace and T. G. Dobzhansky. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1959. 205 pp. with index. \$4.75.

Nuclear Policy for War and Peace, by Thomas E. Murray. The World Publishing Company, 1960. 241 pp. \$4.00.

Mr. Kramish, a member of the research staff of the Rand Corporation, presents in compact, readable, and comprehensive form the history, the present scope, and future possibilities of nuclear research and development in the Soviet Union. The author has assembled his information after systematically scanning many thousands of Soviet newspapers and technical journals. The reader will learn to his surprise, for example, that the Russians really pioneered in certain aspects of the development of nuclear energy. The rapid pace of Soviet progress in the field is fully described with information on resources, testing centers, personnel, organization. The book also presents the conditions under which Soviet scientists have to labor in the service of the Kremlin.

The second of the above listed books is a splendid background for an understanding of some of the dangers accompanying the development in the use of atomic energy. The au-

thors are well-known geneticists—Dr. Wallace at Cornell and Dr. Dobzhansky at Columbia. The book includes basic information, reliable but not too technical in its presentation, about heredity, genes, and chromosomes, about spontaneous mutation, about atomic energy and radiation, about mutation induced by radiation, and about the effects of radiation-induced mutation on populations. The book removes some of the myths about the possible effects of atomic explosion upon people and population, but at the same time it underlines the dangers related to atomic fall-out and radiation.

The author of the third of the above listed books is one of America's forthright spokesmen on nuclear energy matters. Mr. Murray, a well-known engineer and industrialist, served on the Atomic Energy Commission from 1950 to 1957. In the years of his connection with the Commission he became known for the controversial opinions he expressed on a number of issues—the powers of the Commission, the suspension of H-bomb tests, the development of small weapons for limited war, the secrecy policy, and the role of government in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Mr. Murray is at present a special consultant for the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. In the present book Mr. Murray analyzes the key question around our national atomic policy and discusses some of the crucial ethical problems. The author is critical of many of the things America has done and is doing in the important field of development of nuclear energy.

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He outlines the fundamentals of a more realistic nuclear policy. This book is a very important contribution to the debate on the great question of our century.

Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, by Lester B. Pearson. Harvard University Press, 1959. 114 pp. \$2.75.

This is a short and inspired book by a man of wide experience in modern diplomacy. Mr. Pearson, President of the Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his great service in connection with the Middle East crisis of late 1956.

The author speaks of the great difficulties facing diplomats today, the new hazards that beset diplomacy, the high price of mistakes and failures. The modern world is one in which the time available for complex decisions in the international field may be measured in hours or less. All the formal margins of safety have been cut to the vanishing point.

Mr. Pearson, speaking from the background of thirty years of diplomatic experience, urges that heads of states and foreign ministers reduce their roles in the field of peripatetic individual diplomacy. He urges that ambassadors be given once more a station of responsibility.

Writing as a Canadian, Mr. Pearson has many things to say that are refreshing and wise to be read in the United States.

Inspection for Disarmament, edited by Seymour Melman. Columbia University Press, 1959. 291 pp. \$6.00.

Who Wants Disarmament? by Richard J. Barnet with an introduction by Chester Bowles. The Beacon Press, Inc., 1960. 140 pp. with notes. \$3.50.

The first of these two useful books on disarmament, the overarching issue of today in international affairs, reports a study conducted by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University. The editor is Associate Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering at Columbia. The book includes a general report of sixty some pages written by Dr. Melman and nineteen papers dealing with as many aspects of the disarmament problem. This is an important background book on the most important issue of our time.

Mr. Barnet, author of the second book listed above, is a practicing attorney and staff member of the Harvard University Russian Research Center. He has long been a student of Soviet affairs. His book is a very useful guide to the intricate and involved disarmament debate since the first disarmament conference between the Soviet Union and the United States fourteen years ago. The author exposes the essential issues and gives a concise account of the progress, the ups and downs, of the protracted negotiation. He discusses America's real position on the issue, the effects of indecision in government, Russian propaganda in reference to disarmament, the international setting for real disarmament. A seven-page introduction by Chester Bowles underlines the intricate difficulty and extreme urgency of the disarmament question.



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